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I. Introduction 
 Mexico is at war. Since 2006, the Mexican government has struggled to impose 
order and control between the state’s many competing drug trafficking organizations. 
While this conflict can be viewed as a civil war, it has an important international 
dimension: the drug trade is fueled by the United States’ consumer demand for drugs. 
The U.S. government, conscious of drug trafficking and spillover violence on its southern 
border, is somewhat constrained in both its capability and willingness to intervene. 
Mexico’s weak police and judicial institutions, as well as varying levels of executive 
corruption, make intervention on behalf on of the state risky. Collusion is part of 
Mexico’s political culture, especially where the trade is so lucrative and the executive 
payouts are substantial. Furthermore, the American public is less inclined to support 
expensive and dangerous involvement in a drug war than another kind of war. The U.S. 
has, despite this, exerted powerful influence on the progression of this ongoing conflict. 
The Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) has allegedly provided intelligence and 
weapons to the powerful Sinaloa Cartel in an effort to streamline drug traffic but most 
details have been concealed.1 Empowering Sinaloa dominance over the flow of drugs 
from production in the south to wholesale in the north would, in theory, moderate 
violence-producing cartel rivalries. While it may be realistically difficult to stop the drug 
trade, it is realistically possible to stop the war. 
 A new dimension to this stalling conflict emerged in mid-2012 and early 2013. 
                                                        
1
 These allegations stem from an investigative report published by El Universal in early 
2014. The newspaper gathered “official and court documents from Mexico and the 
United States and interviewed over a hundred active or retired officials from each 
country.” The report is plausible and convincing. The evidence corroborates with the 
steady rise of the Sinaloa Cartel on the same timeline as the supposed cooperation with 
the US. Doris Gómora, "La guerra secreta de la DEA in Mexico," El Universal, January 
6, 2014. 
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These were the fuerzas autodefensas or “self-defense forces,” which arose first in the 
states of Michoacán and Guerrero, then spread outwards throughout southern Mexico. 
The ranks of the self-defense groups are composed of mostly poor rural men responding 
to cartel violence in their communities. Not only did these self-defense groups prove to 
be an unlikely force for good, emerging—improbably—from a landscape of fear and 
criminality, but they were also effective. To varying degrees of success, these groups 
managed to purge cartel leaders from their towns and villages, redistribute the balance of 
power of the community, and restore, in some small way, order. The autodefensas 
exceeded the expectations of their human-interest narrative: these were tactical, though 
localized, victories the state had not produced in six years. With momentum unimpeded 
by the central government, the groups proliferated rapidly, reproducing the same models 
of organization. Seventeen out of the thirty-two Mexican states currently have or at some 
point in the last three years had self-defense forced operating within their boundaries.  
 Few academic inquiries have been made into the cause and effects of these self-
groups, likely due to a lack of data amidst a live issue. The phenomenon is frequently yet 
superficially covered in both Spanish and English language media, but many questions 
remain. What underlying mechanisms impel private individuals, many without proper 
weaponry or training, to resist well-funded, well-organized, and well-defended organized 
criminals? Why did these groups emerge in 2012, and not before? And why are the self-
defense groups concentrated in a southern bloc of states, as opposed to cropping up only 
in the most violent regions? 
 The cluster of self-defense groups in the South must be caused by something 
sociological particular to the region. The cluster is not evenly correlated with areas with 
 4 
the greatest drug-related violence. The southern states contain larger indigenous 
populations. No Mexicans have a more place-based identity than the indigenous 
population. Furthermore, Mexico’s indigenous people are a minority within a minority. 
They are poor, rural, and many do not speak Spanish. Their remote locations, lack of 
state infrastructure, and cultural otherness make indigenous communities more inclined 
to autonomous self-organization. Indigenous populations tend to occupy the fringes; their 
cultural survival often depends on it. Cartels, too, seek refuge from state control, although 
for criminal, not cultural reasons. Indigenous communities, which rely less on the state to 
begin with, could reasonably be the first to react, proactively, to failure of the state to 
maintain order. Does indigenous marginalization from the federal state and the resulting 
social capital explain why the self-defense groups emerge where they do? 
II. Literature Review 
 There is an argument to be made for classifying the Mexican drug war as a civil 
war. A common political science definition of a civil war is “an internal conflict with at 
least 1,000 combat-related deaths per year.”2 This criterion is widely replicated 
throughout the literature in political science. According to data compiled by Diego Valle-
Jones, drug-war related homicides surpassed the 1,000 mark in December 20093 and have 
stayed above that threshold since. As these are combat-related deaths, the civil war 
literature provides a helpful existing explanatory framework for understanding the 
emergence of Mexico’s self-defense forces. The following section will review the 
existing literature and assess its relevance to indigenous Mexico. 
                                                        
2
 Paul Collier and Anke Hoeffler, "Greed and grievance in civil war," Oxford Economic 
Papers 56, no. 4, (2004): 565.  
3
 Diego Valle-Jones, "Interactive Map of the Drug War in Mexico," diegovalle.net, 
Accessed February 23, 2015, http://www.diegovalle.net/narcomap. 
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 Mexico’s current crisis is most simply understood as a civil war fought between 
the state government and Mexico’s drug-trafficking organizations (DTOs), but the 
evolving picture defies simplicity. When former President Felipe Calderón cracked down 
on drug trafficking organizations in 2006, there were seven main DTOs: the 
Tijuana/Arellano Felix organization (AFO), the Sinaloa cartel, the Juárez/Vicente Carillo 
Fuentes organization (CFO), and the Gulf cartel. Since then, these seven groups have 
fractured into an unknowably larger number, allowing the drug trade to survive in a form 
more suited to guerrilla-style confrontations. In the chaos, more regional DTOs have 
emerged to cash in on the profitable trade, further destabilizing the system of cartel 
territory. As the conflict went on, it became harder for the state to identify and locate its 
targets, and harder for the cartels to do the same for its rivals. If the war is just a 
crackdown on drug traffic, what distinguishes it from especially bloody law enforcement? 
The dichotomous distinction between State and Criminal is somewhat false. Mexico’s 
drug cartels have become entrenched and powerful in an atmosphere of state collusion 
and tacit tolerance. The cartels wield fear and violence, administer taxes, and empower 
themselves with authority over life and death with a state-like assurance, but without the 
state’s limitations of legality, morality, or transparency. Although the cartels are, from the 
perspective of the state, something of a rebel army, they have been apart of the 
established order in Mexico for decades. 
 The self-defense forces opened up a third front on this civil war. Self-defense 
group members were—like the cartels—rebels but—like the state—fighting the cartels. 
Civilians were not only arming themselves with weapons in a state where private 
ownership of firearms is highly restricted, but going out and turning them on local 
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officials and cartel members alike. Again, to think these self-defense groups are wholly 
distinct from the state and the politics of drug trafficking would be naïve. Cartels often 
compel farmers to produce marijuana or opium poppy, in exchange for protection. 
Would-be self-defense group members are drawn from this same pool of farmers. Once 
the self-defense groups became a recognized phenomenon, the national cartels surely 
recognized the value of these groups to eliminate regional rivals. The self-defense groups, 
despite their purer motives, pursue their goals with the same violence as cartels. 
 The literature explains the eruption of civil wars as a combination of motive and 
opportunity. Motives can come in the form of perceived or objective grievances, usually 
against a political system, economic condition, or ethnic group. Opportunities refer to 
atypical conditions that favor rebellion, such as lower financial costs or greater financing 
for armed rebellion. Though I have divided the literature review between these two 
categories, I recognize that they are by no means discrete. Both motive and opportunity 
continuously influence the other. Opportunity makes motives more pronounced. Without 
a preexisting motive, opportunities tend to go unnoticed. 
 Motives for rebellion generally come in the form of ethnic conflict, political 
marginalization, or economic inequality. The ethnic conflict school claims that violence 
between ethnic groups results from historical antagonism. Scholars in this tradition 
predict that greater levels of ethnic diversity will be more likely to lead to civil war. Toft 
(2002) studies ethnic violence, but finds that settlement patterns—not ancient hatreds—
determine a group’s readiness to be mobilized by rebellion. Settlement patterns refer to 
where groups live and whether they are a minority or a majority. “Territory is often a 
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defining attribute of a group’s identity,”4 especially when that territory is a homeland. So, 
where ethnic motives do exist, the territorial distribution of the groups predicts rebellion 
stronger than the hatred itself.  
 Mexico’s indigenous populations have an ethnic component and experience 
greater levels of marginalization and poverty than the national average. Though the 
indigenous body is fractured into 62 different language groups, they have no developed 
persisting ancient hatreds against each other. This is likely due to the fact that the 
indigenous identity is more marginalized than the specific Yaqui or Zapotec identity. The 
indigenous groups have more formidable adversary than each other: the state. 
 Unusually weak political rights or unusually high inequality often crop up along 
ethnic lines. Easterly and Levine (1997) argue that political marginalization and 
institutionalized economic inequality are the mechanisms that generate grievance. Here, 
ethnicity is only an indirect cause of civil war. Fearon and Laitin (2003) also hypothesize 
that income inequality and policies of discrimination should be associated with higher 
risk for civil war. Additionally, since certain regime types provide checks on inequality 
and discrimination, Fearon and Laitin (2003) also predict that measures of political 
democracy will be associated with lower risks for conflict. 
 Collier and Hoeffler (2004) claim that economic-motives are better predictors of 
civil war than grievance-motives. Greed is universal, according to Hirshleifer’s 
Machiavelli Theorem: “no one will ever pass up an opportunity to gain a one-sided 
                                                        
4
 Monica D. Toft, "Indivisible territory, geographic concentration, and ethnic war." 
Security Studies 12, no. 2 (2002), 86. 
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advantage by exploiting another party.”5 In the context of indigenous communities that 
are objectively lacking in state support, this tendency to grab opportunity is not greedy. 
This is, instead, gain: they are seeking an equitable share as guaranteed by the 
constitution. 
 Rebellion extracts costs. Opportunity exists where the costs of rebellion are 
suddenly reduced, or the hypothetical profits are suddenly greater. State failure, defined 
by Weber as loss of “the monopoly of the legitimate use of physical force,”6 is an 
opportunity. Popular dissatisfaction with the regime greases the wheels for the two other 
opportunities: finance and recruitment. 
 Without some form of financial backing, grievance-motives cannot be borne out 
to the extent that they produce civil war. Collier and Hoeffler (2004) lay out three 
common sources for rebel finance: natural resources, donations, and hostile governments. 
There is only middling support for each of these considerations in predicting the break 
out of civil conflict. For instance, Klare (2001) argues that resources, for example the 
extortion of cocaine in Columbia, predict the geography of conflict. Collier and Hoeffler 
point out, however, that states with resource-based economies, like Russia and Saudi 
Arabia, can result in greater state control over financing, not less. Opportunities that arise 
in the form of “atypically low cost”7 are probably more influential than atypically high 
financing. 
                                                        
5
 Jack Hirshleifer, The Dark Side of Force: Economic Foundations of Conflict Theory 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001), 10-1. 
6
 Max Weber, "Politics as a Vocation," in From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology, ed. by 
H H. Gerth and C. Wright Mills (New York: Oxford University Press, 1946). 
7
 Collier and Hoefller, “Greed,” 569. 
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 Mexico is the ninth largest producer of oil in the world. Pemex, the state-owned 
oil company, had never commercially maximized the economic potential of its oil 
reserves due to its 76-year monopoly. In 2013, however, Mexico’s Congress approved an 
energy reform bill that allows for privatization. The effect of Mexico’s oil privatization 
on rebellion financing could go several ways. For the state economy, this means a boost 
to the industry and the economy. For indigenous communities located on or near oil-rich 
land, this could mean yet another threat to their territory. Now that foreign investment is 
open, hostile governments, or would-be rebel financiers, may be less likely to support 
uprising over defense of a profitable oil field. 
 Where opportunity costs are lower, rebellion is more likely. Where 
unemployment is high, the income foregone by rebelling is low and the loss of productive 
labor is minimal. The individual’s calculation of opportunity cost is essential to 
recruitment. Unlike states, rebel movements do not have standing armies to call upon. 
Walter’s (2004) work on recurring civil war stresses the importance of factors related to 
rebel recruitment. She claims that recruitment is more likely where individuals are 
severely dissatisfied and perceive violence as the only available tool for improvement.8 
Recruitment capitalizes on the motives of economic inequality or political 
marginalization, but becomes appealing once the status quo is “perceived to be worse 
than the possibility of death in combat.”9 Collier & Hoeffler (2004), again, would 
contend that greed, not the hope for improvement of intolerably low living standards 
produces recruitment. The opportunity cost of rebellion in Mexico is quite low. Foregone 
                                                        
8
 Barbara F. Walter, "Does Conflict Beget Conflict? Explaining Recurring Civil War," 
Journal of Peace Research 41, no. 3 (2004): 374. 
9
 Ibid. 
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income in Mexico is low, because of high unemployment and underemployment. Drug 
war violence is already pervasive. Rebellion against the cartel system would not be 
choosing violence—that is not a choice for the average citizen—but a choice to defend 
oneself against it. 
 Geographic factors are also a reoccurring theme in the literature. A given 
territory’s terrain is fixed. While it is not a dynamic variable like motives and 
opportunities, terrain is an especially important determinant. Statistics from Collier and 
Hoeffler (2004) show that in conflict 25 percent of the terrain is mountainous, versus 
only 15 percent in regions at peace.10 Fearon and Laitin (2003) support this thesis. They 
argue that rough terrain as well as areas “poorly served by roads, at a distance from the 
centers of state power”11 favor insurgency. For Fearon and Laitin, factors that favor 
insurgency are key predictors for civil conflict. In civil conflicts involving more than two 
rebel groups, however, the terrain can provide mutual opportunity for adversaries, thus 
complicating its impact. Nevertheless, rough terrain provides an edge for rebels. 
 Indigenous communities may be prone to rebellion due to their geographic 
location. Indigenous communities tend to live in distant rural areas the state cannot 
properly service with infrastructure or defend with law enforcement. Normally, in a 
traditional civil war, this would favor rebel violence against the state. In Mexico, where 
there is a three-sided civil conflict involving the state, the cartels, and the citizens, rural 
areas favor both the cartels and the rebels. Since the rebels are defending themselves 
                                                        
10
 Collier and Hoeffler, “Greed,” 570. 
11 James D. Fearon, and David D. Laitin, "Ethnicity, Insurgency, and Civil War," 
American Political Science Review 97, no. 1 (February 2003), 80. 
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against the cartels, and not attempting the overthrow of state authorities, the effect of 
geography is minimal in predicting the self-defense phenomenon. 
 In the case of Mexico, the grievance-motives of ethnicity, political 
marginalization, and economic inequality intersect most drastically for indigenous 
communities. The existing literature points to the role of indigenous communities in 
producing rebellion. The following theory provides an explanation for how indigenous 
marginalization can produce rebellion, with social capital as an intervening variable. 
III. Theory 
 Social capital exists in Mexico’s indigenous communities. Social capital is by 
nature intangible, but it is inherent in indigenous self-expression, cultural survival, and 
the recent emergence of an indigenous human rights discourse. From the Mexican 
Revolution of 1910 to the Zapatista Uprising in 1994, indigenous people have mobilized 
their social capital to political ends. The land reforms and rights reassurances that 
followed these indigenous calls to arms encapsulate the Mexican state’s failure of will or 
policy to properly address systematic inequality. The marginalization and de facto 
autonomy of indigenous communities experience has resulted in the improbable 
thickening of social capital. Flexing and mobilizing their social capital over the last 
century, Mexico’s indigenous communities have proven their ability to grow in hostility. 
The following theory presents the history of indigenous Mexico and its intersections with 
the state, with social capital as the intervening link between collective identity and its 
politicization. 
Collective Identity  
 Collective action, though a necessary component of human society, is notoriously 
difficult to foment. Collectives deal in social capital. Social capital is defined as social 
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networks bound together by norms of reciprocity.12 In spite of the individual’s 
contradictory multitude of identities and self-interests, social capital develops, collectives 
emerge. Norms of reciprocity underpin group behavior, whether that group is a 
paramilitary or the PTA. Only deviant collective action requires that these norms of 
reciprocity to be greater than the norms handed down by society at large.  
 Putnam (2000) categorizes social capital in two ways: bonding social capital and 
bridging social capital. Bonding social capital is “inward looking and tend[s] to reinforce 
exclusive identities and homogenous groups.”13 Bonding social capital, while it inspires 
deep and loyal connections among groups, can reinforce narrow identities at the expense 
of broader social cooperation. Bridging social capital, however, is “outward looking and 
encompass[es] people across diverse social cleavages.”14 Groups with thick bonding 
social capital cooperate because of shared identities and interests; groups characterized 
by bridging social capital cooperate in spite of diversity. These categories are not strictly 
dichotomous. Bonding and bridging social capital can exist simultaneously or 
independently, depending on the situation.  
 Social capital, like any form of capital, implies a direction, a potential energy 
waiting to be borne-out. Putnam (2000) warns of social capital’s so-called dark side; he 
writes, while “networks and the associated norms are generally good for those inside the 
network, the external effects of social capital are by no means always positive.”15 The 
social capital between soldiers in a rebel army or Mexico’s autodefensas is of the dark 
variety. 
                                                        
12
 Robert Putnam, Bowling Alone, (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2000), 21. 
13
 Ibid., 22. 
14
 Ibid. 
15
 Ibid. 
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 But what causes social capital to go dark? When a group is motivated to act out 
against the power structure, the structure has failed the group in some fundamental way. 
The social contract has been violated. This can happen a number of ways. Some are 
broad and affect whole nations, like the state’s loss of a monopoly on the use of 
legitimate force or deterioration of the rule of law. Trust in official institutions is low, so 
interpersonal trust becomes more potent in response. Institutional failure alone is not 
enough. The civil war literature contends that grievance-motives often occur due to 
political marginalization and economic inequality. These political and economic 
grievances are often historically perpetuated along ethnic lines. Generalized distrust in 
the state cements into grievance in cases of intersectionality, where political, economic, 
and ethnic oppressions overlap. 
 Indigenous people suffer these intersections of oppression as a function of 
geography. Indigenous communities, by definition, are bound to their location and 
ethnically bound to each other. Place-based social capital is stronger than function-based 
social capital. Place-based social capital is characterized by “dense, multi-stranded, well-
exercised bonds,” while function-based social capital is “thin, single-stranded, surf-by 
interactions.”16 There can be no more quintessential example of a place-based social 
network than an indigenous community. Indigenous social capital, partially ethnic, 
partially territorial, partially political, partially economic, is reproduced over decades. In 
a post-colonial world, where racial hierarchies are obsolete within liberal democratic 
paradigms, this collective identity persists under immense pressure to assimilate or 
                                                        
16
 Ibid.,184. 
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disappear. As such, indigenous communities ought to have both dense social capital and 
long-standing grievance-motives: they are at high risk for social rebellion. 
Tierra y Libertad 
 The indigenous identity across Latin America has become increasingly politicized 
over the past few decades. There are over 11 million indigenous people living in Mexico, 
approximately 10 percent of the population.17 “Indigenous” was obviously not a 
politically distinct category until colonization, While the truest origin of the politicization 
of indigenous identity would Spain’s colonization of Mexico in 1519, the relevant history 
begins with the 1910 Mexican Revolution. 
 Even today, political legitimacy derives from association with the Mexican 
Revolution. The most continuously powerful political party throughout the twentieth 
century, the Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI), which holds the presidency to this 
day, bears its revolutionary credentials in its name. The revolution—and the political 
restructuring that followed—forever linked the government to the peasant, “by whom and 
on whose behalf the revolution was fought.”18 The revolution was incited by the poor 
harvest of 1908-9, which outstripped the wages of the rural poor, who at that time formed 
the bulk of the population. Peasants mobilized to upend the feudal system, believing that 
the wealth of the land ought to be returned to those who worked it. This ideology is 
summed up by the rallying cry of revolutionary leaders such as Emilio Zapata and 
Francisco “Pancho” Villa: Tierra y Libertad (“Land and Liberty”). The heirs of these 
                                                        
17
 This is one of the lower estimates floating around, but it’s taken from the same data set 
I reference later on in my analysis, so I’ve chosen it for consistency. Comisión Nacional 
para el Desarrollo de los Pueblos Indígenas (CDI). "Catalogo de localidades indígenas 
2010." 
18 Courtney Jung, "Politics of Indigenous Identity: Neoliberalism, Cultural Rights, and 
the Mexican Zapatistas," Social Research 70, no. 2 (2003), 438. 
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peasant identifiers—the rural, the poor—have largely, though not exclusively, been 
indigenous communities. The two conditions are strongly correlated. The peasant and 
indigenous identities are inextricably linked. Further, modern Mexican identity on the 
whole is strongly tied to the land and the historic rights of peasant farmer. 
 The Mexican Constitution of 1917, which marked the end of the revolution, 
explicitly upholds indigenous rights. Article 2 exclusively pertains to indigenous 
communities, defined as those that “constitute a social, economic, and cultural unit, are 
situated in a territory, and have their own authorities in accordance with their traditions 
and customs.”19 Article 2 guarantees self-determination and equal opportunity. It is 
telling how close to the beginning this reassurance comes in the document, up front, right 
after the general guarantees of equality protected in Article 1. Then, acknowledging that 
“hardship and lack of development”20 permeates indigenous communities, Article 2 goes 
on to detail nine areas where the authorities plan on improving: (1) quality of life; (2) 
levels of schooling; (3) access to health care; (4) improvement of basic social services 
and infrastructure; (5) incorporation of women; (6) communications; (7) creation of jobs; 
(8) protection of indigenous migrants; and (9) democratization. We know that laws such 
as this, which guarantee equality, typically only arise in response to glaring inequality. 
So, we also know that these legal protections would not exist to affirm the equality of 
indigenous people, and then go on to enumerate the many ways the central government 
can improve its policy with regards to their communities, unless they were already 
                                                        
19
 Constitute Project, "Mexico's Constitution of 1917 with Amendments through 2007," 
3. 
20
 Ibid., 4. 
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severely disadvantaged. Indigenous peasants were the spark plug of the revolution and 
therefore dictated the constitutional framework that endures to this day. 
 Usos y Costumbres 
 The Zapatista Uprising, named after the Mexican Revolutionary leader Emilio 
Zapata, is the most recent and explicitly indigenous military movement to take place in 
Mexico. The movement was made possible by bridging social capital, formed atop 
indigenous bonding social capital. The Uprising began in the state of Chiapas on January 
1, 1994, the same day the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) went into 
effect. NAFTA’s central aim was to remove trade barriers and tariffs between Mexico, 
the United States, and Canada. Under the idealistic logic of free trade, with full 
employment, NAFTA would incentivize noncompetitive producers to move into other 
sectors, maximizing productivity. The Mexican reality is high unemployment and 
underemployment. In this situation, Jung explains, “farmers who are forced out of 
agriculture are unable to move to another sector.”21 The indigenous population of 
Chiapas stood up against an encroaching globalism that claimed to do universal good but 
did damage to them as individuals. The indigenous identity is fundamentally at odds with 
the goals of the Mexican government that wants to modernize along with its neighbors: 
“demands for collective rights are in tension with the commitments of liberal 
democracies to individual rights.”22 NAFTA, however, comparatively disadvantaged 
most Mexican producers against their American and Canadian counterparts; and thus we 
see rebellion in Chiapas.  
                                                        
21
 Jung, “Politics,” 439. 
22
 Ibid., 433. 
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 The Zapatista Uprising, similar to the fuerzas autodefensas, was geographically 
contained. The Zapatista Army of National Liberation Army (EZLN) was rebelling 
against more than free trade. The EZLN also formed in response to the amendments 
made in 1992 to Article 27 of the constitution made in 1992. Article 27 had embodied 
Mexico’s historic commitment to land reform. It mandated the state redistribute land 
more equitably in the form of ejidos. Ejidos are plots of communal property that cannot 
be bought and sold. Communal land ownership is a central element of indigenous culture. 
As such some of these land parcels were designated communidades agrarias, which were 
reserved exclusively for indigenous communities. In Chiapas, where ejidos make up 54 
percent of exploitable land,23 the amendment of Article 27 drastically upended everyday 
life. Indigenous people make up 32 percent of the total state population in Chiapas.24 
Traditional indigenous life was under fire.  
 The Zapatistas first emerged from the Lacandón Jungle. Their first declaration 
explicitly addressed the indigenous plight: “We are the product of 500 years of struggle.” 
In Lacandón, however, where Zapatista support emanates, as Jung writes, “indigenous 
traditions and language communities have not been intact since the mid-twentieth 
century.”25 Indigenous identity, like all identity, is fluid and complex. Due to the 
contentious history between indigenous people and the Mexican government, pivoting on 
land reform, this identity has become highly malleable. In this picture, it is easy to 
conflate the indigenous, peasant, and “communist” identities. The EZLN alone has been 
characterized as all three.  
                                                        
23
 Deborah J. Yashar, "Contesting Citizenship: Indigenous Movements and Democracy in 
Latin America," Comparative Politics 31, no. 1 (October 1998), 35. 
24
 CDI, “Catalogo 2010.” 
25
 Jung, “Politics,” 457. 
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 The Zapatista Uprising opened the door to formal negotiations for indigenous 
rights. These negotiations culminated in the San Andrés Peace Accords, signed in 1996. 
While they granted autonomy in letter to the indigenous people of Mexico, they failed to 
come to any real resolutions on land reform, the entire purpose for the uprising. The 
Accords helped to legitimize the indigenous discourse globally, but epitomize its failed 
promise. The Accords’ vague wording, specifically rampant use of the phrase usos y 
costumbres (referring to indigenous “customs and traditions”), was superficially 
respectful but ultimately mocking. The document shills autonomy as if it were 
introducing a new idea, when in fact indigenous people had been experiencing for a “de 
facto autonomy of neglect”26 for 500 years. There has been a spike in reverence for 
indigenous issues, thanks to the rising influence of International Organizations like the 
United Nations.27 The most notable contribution of the San Andrés Peace Accords, 
however, has been its source of yet another indigenous grievance.  
Back to the Land 
 Mexico’s post-NAFTA agricultural policy has conformed to the theme of 
indigenous neglect. Government farm subsidies have risen since 2001, ostensibly in 
response to critiques that NAFTA disadvantages small producers. Scholars have argued 
that this spending has been mishandled, however, and instead of counteracting global 
disadvantages is in fact “subsidizing inequality.”28 The most progressive arm of this 
spending spree has been Procampo, Mexico’s single largest agricultural program. 
                                                        
26
 Jung, “Politics,” 435. 
27
 In 2000, for example, The United Nations established a UN Permanent Forum on 
Indigenous Issues. 
28
 Jonathan Fox and Libby Haight, "Subsidizing Inequality: Mexican Corn Policy Since 
NAFTA,” Woodrow Center For International Studies (2010). 
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Mexico’s farm policy, on the whole, is “sharply biased against low-income producers.”29 
Procampo was designed to target smallholders, specifically “non-irrigated corn growers 
with fewer than 5 hectares.”30 Indigenous smallholders are prime recipients for Procampo 
investment, then, as they account for one quarter of Mexico’s farms.31 Little of this so-
called progressive spending is reaching indigenous municipalities, only 12.4 percent.32 In 
all likelihood, 12.4% is actually an overestimate, because the definition of “indigenous 
municipality” is that only 40% of the population identify as indigenous. These 
municipalities are actually majority non-indigenous, and those farmers have more land. 
So, it is probable that this spending is reaching towns and villages where indigenous 
people live, but not the indigenous farmers themselves. Even Mexico’s most pro-poor 
spending program is doing a poor job of reaching the truly poor. 
 The underlying land-based grievances that ignited indigenous social capital and 
compelled communities to violent rebellion persist, and continue to be perpetuated, even 
as policymakers attempt to address them. As such, conditions that were necessary to 
producing social movements like the Zapatista Uprising can still be found in 
contemporary indigenous communities. This politicized indigenous identity has not, as 
the history demonstrates, developed in response to direct threats against uniquely 
indigenous usos y costumbres. Indigenous languages and cultural behaviors do not incite 
political or economic marginalization. Actually, Jung writes, the “indigenous identity 
develops political resonance only to the extent that it is employed by the state itself as a 
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marker of inclusion or exclusion.”33 Social capital is the link between political expression 
and indigenous communities. The indigenous identity has only become overtly 
politicized where movements have been able to drawn upon preexisting indigenous 
networks.34 Indigenous social capital, reproduced over generations through Putnam’s 
virtuous cycles, provides the organizational scaffolding for social movements to occur. 
Due to the unequal treatment of indigenous municipalities, there are grievances that turn 
this social capital dark. Therefore, organized rebellion is more likely in Mexico’s 
indigenous communities. 
Hypotheses 
 (H1) Mexican states with an above average percentage indigenous population will 
be more likely to form self-defense groups due to thick social capital present in 
indigenous communities. 
 (H2) High marginalization results in the “the autonomy of neglect,” which in turn 
generates social capital due to the impulse for cultural survival.  
 (H3) Highly marginalized indigenous communities will be more likely to form 
self-defense groups.  
IV. Methods 
 Mexico has 32 federal entities: 31 states and one federal district. 17 states have 
self-defense groups and 15 do not. I use these states as my unit of analysis for the case 
studies because it is the simplest way to breakdown the country’s geography and gather 
patterns. My aim was to cover as many relevant cases as possible. 
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 In the case selection process, I focused on the cluster of self-defense groups in the 
south. Determining whether self-defense groups, the dependent variable, operate or not in 
a state was straightforward. Mexico’s indigenous population is by nature dispersed, so 
deciding what constituted “low” indigenous presence was more complicated. I found the 
average indigenous population across the states: 10.44 percent. The indigenous 
populations of each Mexican state can be found in Table 1 below. The cases are 
organized according to presence of the independent variable. 
 I eliminated cases that were both outside the cluster region and below average 
indigenous population. This eliminated 11 states: Aguascalientes, Baja California, Baja 
California Sur, Coahuila de Zaragoza, Chihuahua, Distrito Federal, Durango, Nayarit, 
Nuevo León, Tamaulipas, and Zacatecas. I recognize that it would be ideal to discuss the 
indigenous marginalization and social capital of every Mexican state, but seeing as these 
states are less populated on the whole, have small indigenous populations, and are far 
removed from the break out of the phenomenon at hand, their relevance is constrained. 
 Groups within the cluster region, but with a less than 10.44% indigenous 
population, I kept as deviant cases. There are four cases that defy the cluster: Colima, 
Guanajuato, Tlaxcala, and Querétaro. 
 States with self-defense groups that have an above average indigenous population, 
I kept. These are the “most-likely” cases (10): Campeche, Chiapas, Hidalgo, Guerrero, 
Oaxaca, Puebla, Quintana Roo, San Luis Potosí, Veracruz, and Yucatán. 
 States with self-defense groups but with a less than average indigenous population 
I kept. These are the least-likely cases (7): Jalisco, México, Michoacán, Morelos, Sinaloa, 
Sonora, and Tabasco. 
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 All states with incidents of self-defense groups are represented to some degree, 
with the greatest emphasis on my two key cases: Guerrero and Michoacán. I classified 
these as “key cases” because they are where the breakout of this phenomenon occurred 
and, as the movement went on, centers of the most activity. The assumption is that the 
locations with the first and most active self-defense groups will render the most causal 
insight. 
 With the cases, I am able to dig deeper into the nature of the indigenous 
communities. I trace the development of indigenous social capital vis-à-vis rival 
explanations. Indigenous culture is hard to quantify. I recognize that the percentage of a 
population that is indigenous is not the only or truest indicator of the “indigenousness” of 
a given location. All else being equal, however, I assume that states with high numbers of 
indigenous residents have stronger ties that bind. My information comes from the most 
up to date and thorough database available through the Mexican government-funded 
National Commission for the Development of Indigenous Peoples (CDI), the 2010 
Catalog of Indigenous Localities. The CDI considers an indigenous population as made 
up of “all persons belonging to an indigenous home, where the head or spouse of the 
household and/or any of the ancestors (parent, stepparent, grandparent, great great 
grandparent are declared indigenous language speakers.”35 
 I measure indigenous marginalization using the CDI’s 2010 Catalog. The 
database includes a grade of marginalization on an ordinal scale of very low, low, 
medium, high, and very high. Marginalization, due to limitations of the database, can 
only be measured at the municipal and locality level, not on the state level. The CDI’s 
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grade of marginalization is calculated based on nine different indicators. These are: (1) 
percentage of population aged 15 years or more illiterate; (2) percentage of population 
aged 15 years or more without complete primary education; (3) percentage of occupants 
in private dwellings without piped water; (4) percentage of occupants in private dwellings 
without drain or toilet; (5) percentage of occupants in private dwellings without power; 
(6) percentage of occupants in private dwellings with dirt floors; (7) percentage of 
occupants in private dwellings with some level of overcrowding; (8) percentage of 
population in towns with less than five thousand inhabitants; and (9) percentage of 
employed population with two minimum wage workers in the household. 
 A conventional explanation for the emergence of self-defense groups was 
increasing levels of extortion leading up the breakouts of 2012-2013. I consider this a 
scope condition, not a causal explanation. A scope condition here is necessary in creating 
a context where rebellion seems favorable, but is not a sufficient causal explanation. 
Nevertheless, I use Figures of Intentional Homicide, Abduction, Extortion, and Vehicular 
Robbery, 1997-2015 to assess the strength of this explanation versus my own [see Table 
2].  
 In the theory chapter, social capital is the theoretical link between marginalization 
and indigenous communities. Social capital intervenes between the independent and 
dependent variables. I do not have access to the kind of granular data that would indicate 
social capital in indigenous communities. Further, social capital is by nature intangible 
and hard to observe or measure. As such, I do not demonstrate social capital 
quantitatively, but I theoretically assume it operates where there is social rebellion. 
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 The main source for case research has been the media, which presents several 
limitations. I am constrained by the availability and depth of other people’s reporting. 
The violence in Mexico creates a particularly hostile environment for journalists. I am 
further limited by my own Spanish language skills, which are intermediate. For case 
specifics, I draw mainly from online archives of Mexico’s most widely respected 
newspaper, El Universal, from January 2013 to February 2015 or local papers, such as 
Guerrero’s El Sur.  
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Table 1. Mexico’s Indigenous Population by State 
State State Population Indigenous Pop. Indigenous % Self-Defense? 
Aguascalientes 1,184,996 6,426 0.57% No 
Baja California 3,155,070 89,663 2.80% No 
Baja California Sur 637,026 21,749 3% No 
Campeche 822,441 181,805 22% Yes (Most-likely) 
Chiapas  8,435 1,511,015  31.50% Yes (Most-likely) 
Chihuahua 3,406,465 158,527  4.60% No 
Coahuila de Zaragoza 2,748,391 14,638 0.53% No  
Chihuahua 650,555 8,435 1.30% No (Cluster) 
Districto Federal 8,851,080 300,138 3.40% No 
Durango 1,632,934 44,722 2.70% No 
Guanajuato 5,486,372 34,639 0.63% No (Cluster) 
Guerrero 3,388,768 635,620 18.70% Yes (Most-likely) 
Hidalgo 2,665,018 575,161 21.60% Yes (Most-likely) 
Jalisco 7,350,682 96,373 1.30% 
Yes (Least-
likely) 
México 15,175,862 935,690 6.50% 
Yes (Least-
likely) 
Michoacán de Ocampo 4,351,037 213,478 5% 
Yes (Least-
likely) 
Morelos 1,777,227 70,393 4% 
Yes (Least-
likely) 
Nayarit 1,084,979 72,348 6.70% No 
Nuevo León 4,653,458 81,909 1.80% No 
Oaxaca 3,801,962 1,719,464 45% Yes (Most-likely) 
Puebla 5,779,829 1,018,397 17.60% Yes (Most-likely) 
Querétaro 1,827,937 56,664 3% No (Cluster) 
Quintana Roo 1,325,578 904,292 30.50% Yes (Most-likely) 
San Luis Potosí 2,585,518 361,653 14% Yes (Most-likely) 
Sinaloa 2,767,761 53,215 1.90% 
Yes (Least-
likely) 
Sonora 2,662,480 130,448 5% 
Yes (Least-
likely) 
Tabasco 2,238,603 120,635 5.40% 
Yes (Least-
likely) 
Tamaulipas 3,268,554 59,713 1.80% No 
Tlaxcala 1,169,936 72,270 6.20% No (Cluster) 
Veracruz de Ignacio de la Llave 7,643,194 1,037,424 14% Yes (Most-likely) 
Yucatán 1,955,577 985,549 50.40% Yes (Most-likely) 
Zacatecas 1,490,668 10,109 0.70% No 
Catalogo de localidades indigenas 2010, INEGI 
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Table 2. Reported Extortion by State (2006-2014) 
State 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 
Aguascalientes 30 38 51 55 42 114 85 42 33 
Baja California 329 216 322 437 506 356 401 349 291 
Baja California Sur 70 45 56 87 61 50 78 123 38 
Campeche 0 0 0 0 0 0 16 84 50 
Chiapas 87 122 79 72 94 89 118 147 165 
Chihuahua 62 39 264 409 173 238 171 161 20 
Coahuila de Zaragoza 0 0 0 81 64 59 78 104 89 
Colima 0 0 0 0 0 12 5 27 13 
Districto Federal 382 424 874 906 1,117 7,151 1,181 965 641 
Durango 85 65 96 91 265 108 86 82 47 
Guanajuato 120 116 186 340 262 221 523 468 32 
Guerrero 36 44 57 69 53 85 133 174 159 
Hidalgo 82 62 140 155 123 67 57 127 97 
Jalisco 476 406 609 659 948 479 486 790 669 
México 0 0 0 0 0 0 1,039 1,668 1,010 
Michoacán de Ocampo 114 183 293 358 172 184 342 261 202 
Morelos 436 194 245 644 612 228 260 400 357 
Nayarit 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 1 
Nuevo León 82 36 40 57 50 61 196 285 377 
Oaxaca 235 381 326 644 612 228 260 400 357 
Puebla 0 0 0 0 0 3 454 258 179 
Querétaro 43 35 34 37 35 27 40 25 5 
Quintana Roo 22 40 107 112 150 147 229 204 260 
San Luis Potosí 140 226 334 287 185 238 150 119 84 
Sinaloa 51 48 65 74 102 145 129 114 119 
Sonora 45 46 40 26 30 28 37 34 26 
Tabasco 34 60 141 274 194 153 146 188 139 
Tamaulipas 23 55 88 153 107 157 154 225 189 
Tlaxcala 0 0 0 0 1 28 37 83 57 
Veracruz de Ignacio de la 
Llave 159 219 387 370 331 400 447 461 255 
Yucatán 0 0 0 0 1 28 37 83 57 
Zacatecas 13 22 35 16 26 45 63 65 68 
Cifras de homicide doloso, secuestro, extorsión y robo se vehículos 1997-2014, SESNP 
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V. Cases 
 The autodefensas are largely clustered together. The broad pattern to keep in 
mind throughout the cases is the breakout of self-defense groups in the southern coastal 
states and a subsequent spread outward. This chronology—the breakout cases to the 
dynamic cases—also corresponds to the two types of self-defense groups. The two types 
of self-defense groups differ in the scope conditions that created the opportunity for 
rebellion. Both types, however, are more likely to emerge where indigenous social capital 
pre-exists. 
i. Break Out Cases (2) 
Table 2. Indigenous Marginalization: Michoacán 
Dispersed (Less than 40% indigenous) Presence (Roughly 40% indigenous) Indigenous (40% or more 
indigenous) 
 
Municipality Indigenous Presence Marginalization 
Aguililla Dispersed High/Very High 
Apatzingán Dispersed High 
Aquila Indigenous Very High 
Buenavista Dispersed Medium 
Churumuco Dispersed Very High 
Coalcomán Dispersed Medium 
La Huacana Dispersed High 
Los Reyes Indigenous Presence High/Very High 
Morelia Indigenous Presence Very Low 
Parácuaro Dispersed High 
Salvador Escalante Dispersed High 
Tancítaro Dispersed High 
Tepalcatepec Dispersed Medium 
Uruapan Indigenous Presence Very Low 
Zitácuaro Indigenous Presence High 
  Catalogo de localidades indigenas 2010, INEGI 
Michoacán (Least-Likely) 
 Michoacán has thick social capital, partly due to its documented history as “a 
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bastion of defiance”36 dating back to the Spanish conquests. Over the last century, the 
state has generally opposed Mexico’s dominant political party, the Institutional 
Revolutionary Party (PRI), in favor of the scrappier leftist Democratic Revolutionary 
Party (PRD).37  
 The first autodefensas emerged from the Tierra Caliente (“hot land”) region of 
Michoacán in January of 2013. As the name of the region suggests, it is desert. Tierra 
Caliente’s geography predicts violence on a number of levels. Indigenous populations are 
drawn to this location because it is on the fringes of state control; they can live 
autonomously. This dynamic also works in the reverse direction: it is likely there is less 
state control in this region because of the indigenous presence. Cartels are drawn to this 
region because its sparse patrol is ideal for drug production. Opium poppy is the region’s 
main export, which is resilient plant climate-wise as it can withstand the heat and low-
precipitation. 
 Michoacán’s indigenous population does not appear to be the largest percentage-
wise, but this is misleading. At over four million, Michoacán has one of Mexico’s highest 
state populations, thus diluting the indigenous influence. The indigenous-speaking 
population is above 200,000, a reoccurring threshold among the cases where self-defense 
groups occur.  
 Indigenous sentiment is strong in Michoacán because the identity is not fractured 
among different groups. The indigenous population is largely consolidated within the 
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Purépecha language group. Of the 14 municipalities where autodefensas were operating 
after one year38 one was majority indigenous, four had indigenous presence, and nine has 
dispersed indigenous presence [see Table 2]. Dispersion, it seems, is the key element to 
marginalization.  
 The majority-indigenous communities are actually less marginalized than the 
indigenous people who float among non-indigenous communities. In the dispersed 
indigenous municipalities of Aguililla, Buenavista, Churumuco, Coalcomán, La Huacana, 
Parácuaro, Salvador Escalante, Tancítaro, and Tepalcatepec, all the localities, on average, 
had a “high” or “very high” grade of marginalization. Additionally, there is a lot of 
intangible, anecdotal support for the “indigenousness” of these communities. In 
Parácuaro (named after a Purépecha word), they annually celebrate the start of the 
Mexican Revolution on November 20.39 The indigenous identity, it seems, can become 
politicized when indigenous people are a minority within their locality. The dispersed 
indigenous populations are doubly marginalized: first for being indigenous, second for 
being separated from their larger cohort. Dispersion generates marginalization, which in 
turn generates interpersonal trust between “others” leading to greater social capital. 
 The self-defense groups formed in reaction to rising levels of cartel violence. 
Extortion alone is not the cause for the emergence of these autodefensas, however, 
because we see rising extortion in cases with no presence of our dependent variable [see 
table]. The Knights Templar “Los Templarios” is Michoacán’s leading cartel and the 
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original autodefensas’ primary opposition. The cartel has long demanded a share of the 
region’s profitable lime and avocado production by demanding residents pay derecho de 
piso (“right to grounds”) protection money. In 2013, however, cartel leaders “moved 
from illegally taxing agricultural output to actually exerting direct control over 
agricultural production.”40 Individual resistance to extortion was constrained under threat 
of violence and abduction. Hipólito Mora, a lime grower and leader of the Tierra Caliente 
autodefensas, estimates he was losing 70 to 80 percent of his profits per year due to cartel 
intrusions.41  
 Besides the rise in financial crime, there is reason to believe cartel brutality was 
getting worse. Personal experience with extortion, kidnapping, and general cartel 
violence is anecdotally correlated with overall recruitment and especially leadership. Luis 
Antonio Torres González, known as “El Americano,” joined up after he was kidnapped in 
October 2012 and held for a 150,000 USD ransom.42 José Manuel Mireles Valverde, 
leader of the Tepalcatepec autodefensas, has publically stated that his group formed in 
response to cartel members’ sexual abuse of their wives and daughters.43 
 The unique power of the self-defense forces derives from their local legitimacy. 
Political scientist Daniel Zizumbo-Colunga argues that support for the groups is “fueled 
by the combination of low confidence in state law enforcement and high levels of 
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interpersonal trust.”44 The strategic actions of the autodefensas include occupying 
municipal police stations and setting up checkpoints. By taking over police stations, they 
demonstrate their power and symbolically present themselves as the new order. With 
checkpoints, the groups can surveillance the coming and goings of the community with 
an eye towards catching targeted cartel members. These roadblocks spin a weakness into 
strength. While the autodefensas may lack the personnel and weaponry required to 
overpower an entrenched criminal syndicate, they can still trap their targets by restricting 
local movement and simply waiting them out. Information sharing between locals, some 
group members and some not, is essential to the success of this strategy. All these 
measures require local support, or at the very least tolerance, for citizen-administered 
justice.  
 The autodefensas, however, have not relied on popular dissatisfaction with the 
cartels or the failure of law enforcement alone to maintain support. They have worked to 
disseminate the ethic of citizen justice. To build a support, many of these groups maintain 
public relations campaigns through social media, which allow them to craft and broadcast 
a socially legitimate identity. These leaders, unlike cartel leaders, are accessible. And 
unlike political leaders, they are usually forthcoming with their motives and strategic 
intentions, sitting for foreign and domestic interviews. The self-defense group leader’s 
community outreach strategy is proof of the strategic importance of social capital. 
 Over time, the recapture of Apatzingán, a Templar stronghold, became the top 
strategic concern of the self-defense groups. Takeover of the city required coordination 
between several groups and months of planning. The successful recapture of this city on 
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February 8, 2014 has been, perhaps across the movement as a whole, the most 
impressible accomplishment of Mexico’s autodefensas.45 A maneuver of this caliber 
required bridging social capital to motivate groups from several different municipalities 
into collective action. 
 The state of Michoacán, due to the thick social capital present indigenous 
communities—especially the dispersed ones—was able to overcome collective action 
problems and successfully mobilize fuerzas autodefensas. Geography created an 
alignment of indigenous people and cartel members in Tierra Caliente, albeit for different 
reasons. Extortion here created an opportunity for rebellion, but it was not the underlying 
mechanism that explained its success. Leaders responded to an intolerable rise in cartel 
extortion and brutality, but they could only capitalize on pre-existing social structures. 
Table 4. Indigenous Marginalization: Guerrero 
Dispersed (Less than 40% indigenous) Presence (Roughly 40% indigenous) Indigenous (40% or more 
indigenous) 
 
Municipality Indigenous Presence Marginalization 
Apaxtla Dispersed High 
Ayutla Indigenous Very High 
Copala Dispersed High 
Cuactopec Dispersed Very High 
Florencia Villarreal Dispersed High 
Juan R Escuerdo Dispersed High 
Marquelia Dispersed High 
Mártir de Cuilapan Indigenous Very High 
Olinalá Indigenous Very High 
San Luis Acatlán Indigenous Very High 
San Marcos Dispersed Very High 
Tecoanapa Dispersed Very High 
Teloloapan Dispersed High 
Tixtla Indigenous Presence High 
  Catalogo de localidades indigenas 2010, INEGI 
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Guerrero (Most-Likely) 
 Guerrero’s geography is made up of desert46 (Tierra Caliente), mountains (La 
Montaña), and coast (La Costa). Tierra Caliente, as stated, extends in Michoacán; this 
connection can help explain the importance of these two neighboring states. La Montaña 
is the oldest drug production zone in Guerrero.47 As discussed in the literature review, 
atypical geography like desert and mountains are correlated with incidences of civil 
rebellion. This geography lends itself to weak state control that, like in Michoacán, favors 
both indigenous communities and cartels. Guerrero’s main drug exports are marijuana 
and opium poppy: “Marijuana can be grown throughout the state but is most commonly 
planted in lower elevations, especially on the slopes of the Sierra Madre del Sur below 
1,000 meters above sea level. Poppy is grown only in higher elevations, above 1,000 
meters.”48 
 More so than in Michoacán, Guerrero’s rough indicators of indigenous social 
capital predict rebellion. Guerrero has an indigenous population of 635,620 [see Table 1]. 
Guerrero’s indigenous population is diverse, spanning 20 different languages. Of the 14 
known municipalities where self-defense groups operate, four are over 40 percent 
indigenous [see Table 4]. Of the municipalities with indigenous presence (1) or a 
dispersed indigenous population (9), all have “high” or “very high” marginalization.   
 In Guerrero, the emerging groups labeled themselves as policía comunitaria as 
opposed to the more common autodefensas identifier. This is because Guerrero has a 
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precedent of community policing that predates the wave of self-defense groups. Two of 
these policía comunitaria groups remain active, and are intertwined with the proliferation 
of self-defense in recent years. In 1995, indigenous communities in Costa Chica and La 
Montaña jointly formed the Coordinadora Regional de Autoridades Comunitarias y 
Policía Comunitaria (CRAC-PC). Notably, this is the same time indigenous Zapatistas 
are organizing in close-by Chiapas. The CRAC-PC is explicitly indigenous: it “derived 
its legitimacy from the indigenous rights movement and related legal reforms in 
Mexico.”49 In 2012, the Coordinadora Regional de Seguridad y Justicia-Policía 
Ciudadana y Popular (CRSJ-PCP) also formed in the La Montaña region. The CRSJ-
PCP is more contained than the CRAC-PC, but invoked the same legal protections as the 
preceding community defense groups. Both groups were legally justified under Ley 701, 
a piece of state legislation that protects indigenous customs, signed by the governor in 
2011.50 CRAC-PC fought for Ley 701, and CRSJ-PCP formed after the preceding group 
had blazed the legal pathway. Prior to the self-defense movement in question, explicitly 
indigenous community defense groups were forming in Guerrero, and demanding legal 
protection. 
 The influence and power of Guerrero’s DTOs has shifted continuously since the 
mid-1990s. By January 2011, roughly one year before the wave of self-defense groups 
emerges, the state was divided between many small, competing groups. Some cooperated 
with larger DTOs, like Los Zetas, but even more have “no known loyalties, alliances, or 
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affiliations.”51 The fracturing of these groups, and the highly competitive atmosphere it 
created by early 2011, leads to more and more shocking forms of violence. The more 
established, vertically integrated cartels rely less on extortion and kidnapping, which 
deeply impact the local community, than Guerrero’s DTOs do. Guerrero’s small, 
predatory distinctly changed the state’s pattern of violence in the year leading up to the 
self-defense phenomenon. 
 The policía comunitaria groups relevant to the self-defense phenomenon we are 
examining differ from their indigenous predecessors. Their histories, however, are 
intertwined. Guerrero’s first outbreak of self-defense violence happened in Olinalá in 
October 2012. This case is the genesis of self-defense that would proliferate throughout 
2013 and dwindle in relevance by 2015. Olinalá is an indigenous municipality, with 
“very high” marginalization [see Table 4.] Hundreds of villagers banded together to find 
and detain local criminals, guilty of kidnapping and extortion, ostensibly in response to a 
taxi driver’s dead body found two days prior.52 The early Mexican media coverage of 
these events did not label these actions in terms of self-defense, community policing, or 
vigilantism, but revolt. Olinalá “activists,” as some reports called them, first targeting the 
two centers of local authority: the church and the police state. They suspended a feast 
celebration in the church at the center of town and disarmed 16 officers at the municipal 
police station.53 Quickly (and later controversially), the CRAC-PC sought out the Olinalá 
leadership to invite them into their fold. 
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 Another of Guerrero’s community police grew out of a protest group formed in 
January of 2013, composed of “rural villagers in Costa Chica and La Montaña against 
electricity rate hikes.”54 This group, the Unión de Pueblos y Organizaciones del Estado 
de Guerrero (UPOEG), created an offshoot policing group, the Sistema de Seguridad y 
Justicia Ciudadana (UPOEG-SSJC). UPOEG-SSJC, though it coordinated with the 
CRAC, differed from the previous groups. The UPOEG-SSJC does not claim Ley 701 
authority: its “legitimacy derived from the common sense observation that there were no 
alternative means of providing security and from the widespread public support found 
within the communities from which they emerged.”55 The SSJC has no direct indigenous 
connection. Nevertheless, this police network is still a prime example of how self-defense 
groups are more likely to emerge from preexisting social infrastructure.  
 The actions and inciting motivations of these community police are consistent 
with what was seen in Michoacán’s self-defense groups. In the Nahua community of 
Tixtla, villagers set up checkpoints with intent of arresting offenders of kidnapping, 
murder, extortion, assaults, and burglaries.”56 The villagers were responding to local 
upset following, again, finding the dead body of a kidnapped victim. This particular body 
was of a young woman whose family had paid the ransom. Cartel extortion, increasing in 
brutality, is also a reoccurring theme. Bruno Plácido Valerio, leader of the UPOEG, 
stated that groups Tecoanapa and Ayutla de los Libres were partially formed of farmers 
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being charged 500 pesos for each head of cattle.57 There are also charges of sexual 
harassment, as is common across the cases, which provide anecdotal support for 
worsening cartel brutality and irreverence for local communities. Valerio also reports that 
criminals would pay students 50 pesos for information on “the names of pretty girls.”58 
The details about these municipalities are consistent with my theory. Ayutla (indigenous) 
and Tecoanapa (dispersed), both have “very high” marginalization [see Table 4]. Cartel 
abuses provoked group formation and membership, but marginalized communities with 
indigenous social capital are more apt to respond to these provocations. 
 Guerrero’s geography, much like Michoacán’s, made it similarly conducive to 
both drug production and indigenous life. Distinctively, however, Guerrero’s highly 
fractured and unincorporated cartel rivalries make violence more likely between groups 
and—more importantly in explaining the emerge of community self-defense—harder on 
the social fabric of the community. Pre-existing community police groups, which were 
explicitly indigenous and date back to the rise of an indigenous rights discourse in the 
1990s, prove the relevance of indigenous social capital to the self-defense phenomena. 
While extortion, kidnapping, and rising brutality were evident, I classify them as scope 
conditions that made self-organization and defense compelling, but do not explain it. If 
this rising criminality did explain, we would see a more even distribution of self-defense 
groups across the country [see Table 2]. Indigenous social capital, in the case of 
Guerrero, encapsulated by the CRAC-PC and the CRSJ-PCP, is the most accurate 
predictor of why self-defense groups emerge where they do. 
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ii. Most-Likely Cases (9)  
Campeche, Chiapas, Hidalgo, Oaxaca, Puebla, Quintana Roo, San Luis Potosí, 
Veracruz, Yucatán 
 
 The above most-likely cases are “most-likely” to form self-defense groups 
because of their large indigenous populations. These eight states have an average 
indigenous population of 30 percent, significantly higher than Mexico’s overall average. 
In conformation with my theory, the spread of the self-defense group movement outside 
of the break out cases in Michoacán and Guerrero largely adheres to these. As the map 
illustrates, the cluster of self-defense groups that inspired this research significantly 
overlaps with the strong indigenous populations of these most-likely states. 
 The indigenous populations of these states have endured, partially owning to the 
diverse and rugged geography of southern Mexico. The block of Campeche, Chiapas, 
Quintana Roo, and Yucatán have indigenous populations that are predominantly Maya or 
descended from Mayas. So across the Yucatán peninsula there is wide geographical 
diversity, from rainforest to coast to mountain to savannah, as well as dispersed Maya 
ruins which, spurred on by tourist dollars, are the physical embodiment of the power and 
survival of these ancient identities. No one indigenous group dominates Oaxaca, which 
has the largest indigenous population in all of Mexico: there are four main ones, and a 
handful of other minorities (or double-minorities). Veracruz, too, is mixed in terms of 
indigenous population and geography. Hidalgo, mostly mountainous, can attribute the 
survival of its Otomi peoples to their rugged surroundings. Puebla represents a wide 
cross-section of indigenous people, but all are consolidated largely in the Sierra Norte 
and Sierra Negra mountain regions. Indigenous populations and atypical geography, 
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which are inextricably linked, explain the cluster of self-defense groups in southern 
Mexico. 
 In each case, villagers and farmers tired of extortion, kidnapping, and brutality set 
up roadblocks and occupy local centers of authority (town centers, churches, police 
stations). The extortion and kidnapping numbers for the most-likely states can be found 
in Table 2. 
iii. Least-Likely Cases (6) 
Jalisco, México, Morelos, Sinaloa, Sonora, Tabasco 
 
 The six least-likely cases were “least-likely” to form self-defense groups due to 
their comparatively small indigenous populations. I argue that the presence of self-
defense groups in four of these cases (Jalisco, México, Morelos, and Tabasco) can be 
explained by proximity to the larger, indigenous-driven cluster [see map]. Jalisco is 
adjacent to Michoacán; México is wedged in between Michoacán and Guerrero; Morelos 
is tiny so a great deal of its perimeter borders Guerrero; Tabasco is bordered by four 
states with “most-likely” indigenous populations. 
 Jalisco, notably, despite its small indigenous presence, has developed strong 
indigenous social capital in recent years. Huichol is the most prominent indigenous 
language in Jalisco. The Wirikuta mountain is the sacred homeland of the Huichol 
people. Per indigenous tradition, there is an annual pilgrimage to Wirikuta. Though the 
mountain is located in San Luis Potosí, the sacred journey to Wirikuta begins on the coast 
of Jalisco. The Huichol people truly believe the mountain is “alive.”59 As such, Wirikuta 
became an official UNESCO site in 1988. Unluckily, this mountain is also rich in silver, 
and therefore of great economic interest to those outside of the Huichol community. The 
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Mexican government approved the request of a Canadian mining company for control 
over this site in 2009. In 2010, at the height of the self-defense movement, the Huichols 
formed the Regional Council of Wixáritari to fight the mine. We know pre-existing 
indigenous social capital was important in Guerrero. I argue that Jalisco’s indigenous 
social capital, strengthened by its engagement with this recent mining threat, made up for 
its smaller numbers.   
 Sinaloa and Sonora are, on the surface, the most puzzling cases: they are outside 
the cluster and have small indigenous communities. Sinaloa and Sonora are 1.9 and 5 
percent indigenous, respectively [see Table 1]. Based on the assumptions of my theory, 
these states should not have self-defense groups. The self-defense groups that emerged in 
these states were one-offs in that they came long after the wave, in 2014. They did not 
form their own self-defense groups, they joined up with las Guardias Comunitarias de 
Autodefensa,60 a pre-existing group. Specifically, Yaqui and Mayo indigenous groups 
from Sinaloa and Sonora joined Las Guardias, uniting the self-defense groups of the gulf 
and southern regions of Mexico (including Guerrero, Michoacán, and Jalisco.) The 
Sinaloa and Sonora groups had specific aims: to recover 2000 hectares of land where 
wheat and corn is grown from organized crime.61 Seeing as similar goals had already 
accomplished by autodefensas, following their model was sensible. Sonora and Sinaloa 
do not have the sort of indigenous indicators we expect from states with self-defense 
groups, but that is because we do not see the sort of grassroots uprising we see in 
Michoacán or Guerrero. It takes less social capital on the ground to join a group than it 
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does to start one. Their group formation followed trails blazed by other states, states with 
pre-existing indigenous social capital. 
 The least-likely cases, upon closer examination, have the common thread of 
rebellion that I laid out in the theory chapter: indigenous marginalization, as well as 
extortion, a scope condition. 
iv. Defying the Cluster (4) 
Colima, Guanajuato, Tlaxcala, Querétaro  
 
 Colima is a small state direct adjacent to Michoacán, a break out case, and Jalisco, 
a least-likely case. Given its geographical proximity to the cluster, Colima is in territory 
primed for the spread of this phenomenon. Yet, we do not see self-defense groups. 
Firstly, this is due to the conception of Colima as a refuge for criminals, owing to reports 
that its governor, Mario Anguiano, is particularly corrupt.62 Allegedly, cartel leaders who 
fled Tierra Caliente during the break out of self-defense groups in nearby Michoacán 
sought refuge in Colima, and found themselves protected. Most famously among this 
cohort is Servando Gómez Martínez, known “La Tuta,” leader of the Knights Templar 
Cartel.  
  Secondly, there was a known incident in Colima that halted the formation of self-
defense groups. In January 2014, a self-defense group from Aquila (Michoacán) tried to 
enter neighboring municipality of Tecoman (Colima), but were rejected by residents of 
the community. The government in the town of Cerro de Ortega “implemented 
checkpoints and tightened security in rural access roads Colima, trying to prevent armed 
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entry to Colima Territory.”63 The local communities wanted no part of the escalating 
violence in Michoacán, some of which involved self-defense groups. There is evidence of 
collective action here, albeit it manifested itself in a community versus community 
struggle, not against the cartels or the state. 
 In the case of Colima, reported instances of extortion were nonexistent up until 
2010, went up only as high as 27 in 2014 [see Table 2]. It could be that the scope 
conditions of cartel intrusion were simply not met in Colima. Similarly, Tlaxcala and 
Querétaro’s extortion numbers were comparatively low or consistent throughout the 
2006-2014 interval. Guanajuato, alternatively, did experience the spike in crime 
correlated with the emergence of self-defense groups, with 523 reported instances of 
extortion in 2013.  
 In Guanajuato, there were precursors to self-defense group formation, but these 
were false starts. In January 2014, community residents near San Luis de la Paz and San 
Miguel de Allende had a meeting with their regional Deputy Attorney, René Urrutia de la 
Vega, to discuss their concerns about rising extortion, kidnapping, and robbery.64 The 
following February another meeting has been scheduled, but Urrutia de la Vega did not 
show. Protests followed, as did threats to self-organize. This community demonstrated 
good faith attempts to engage with state institutional structures, but were ultimately 
disappointed by their leadership. 
 Though Colima, Guanajuato, Tlaxcala, and Querétaro were within the cluster 
region where self-defense groups flared up between 2012 and 2014, for varying reason 
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the phenomenon never fully caught on in these states. Extortion, the conventional rival 
explanation, rose dramatically in Guanajuato. Extortion either rose slightly or maintained 
similar levels in the three other states. In Colima, Tlaxcala, and Querétaro, scope 
conditions for self-defense formation were not met. 
 What all four states have in common, however, is a low indigenous presence. 
Colima (1.3% indigenous), Guanajuato (0.63% indigenous), Tlaxcala (6.2% indigenous), 
and Queretaro (3% indigenous), all have indigenous populations well below the average 
for Mexican states, and even further below the average for states where self-defense 
groups operate. The lack of self-defense groups in these states proves how indigenous 
social capital is to explaining the autodefensas movement. 
 
Table 5. Descriptive Statistics 
 
Average Indigenous 
Population Overall 
Average Indigenous 
Population in States without 
Self-Defense Forces 
Average Indigenous 
Population in States with Self-
Defense Forces 
10.44% 2.65% 16.49% 
 
VI. Conclusion 
 Table 5 illustrates the strong correlation between indigenous populations and the 
emergence of self-defense groups. This supports H1, which stated that Mexican states 
with an above average percentage indigenous population would be be more likely to form 
self-defense groups. In the theory chapter, I argued that indigenous marginalization 
generates a de facto autonomy of neglect. Indigenous communities have historically 
reciprocated bonds; these bonds would grow stronger throughout the process of 
autonomous development. Indigenous communities, then, have both thick bonding and 
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bridging social capital. This social capital would be the foundation for the self-defense 
groups, once scope conditions were met.   
 Mexico’s indigenous communities have become increasingly politicized since the 
1990s, when they experienced the Zapatista Uprising and the failed promises of the San 
Andrés Peace Accords that followed. Around the same time, there is an indigenous rights 
consciousness raising movement in the global community. The Mexican government’s 
attempts to roll back the negatives impact of globalization on small farming communities, 
through farm subsidy programs like Procampo, evidence anti-indigenous bias and have 
failed to reach communities with the greatest need.  
 Modern political legitimacy is derived from association with the Mexican 
Revolution, which glorified the peasant identity and communal land rights, but in name 
only, not in spirit. Indigenous communities, which still occupy rural areas and practice 
communal farming, are the living remains of those revolutionary ideals, and yet suffer 
from marginalization, rural poverty, and on top of that, cartel violence.  
 While the self-defense groups that emerged in 2012 and 2013 in southern Mexico 
were not revolutionary, they were rebellious organizations that defied the status quo set 
by rent-seeking cartels and the state officials that tolerate them for a payout. In the key 
break out cases, we see the importance of long-term indigenous social capital in 
producing rebellion. Guerrero’s self-defense groups grew out of community police 
groups formed in indigenous communities that had been going since the 1990s. In 
Michoacán, a least-likely case, we saw how dispersed indigenous communities can 
actually face higher marginalization, the indigenous identity is still Other, but without the 
benefit of a community. This supports H2 and H3, which claimed that high 
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marginalization results in autonomy and thick social capital and that highly marginalized 
indigenous communities will be more likely to form self-defense groups, respectively. 
The indigenous identity and marginalization, however, does not have a linear relationship 
with rebel defense. 
 Of course, indigenous communities are not actually “rebellious” the way we 
imagine in most civil conflicts. Indigenous speakers are already outcast, a minority within 
a minority. Many in the rural ancestral areas territories do not develop bilingualism,65 
meaning they cannot speak Spanish. Autonomous living, and autonomous defense if the 
situation demands it, is for them necessary for survival.  
 Leading alternative explanations for the emergence of self-defense groups were 
not true explanations, but conflated with scope conditions. Scope conditions such as 
general insecurity throughout Mexico, rising crime that impacts the social fabric of 
communities (such as extortion and kidnapping), and cartel presence were necessary but 
not sufficient to produce self-defense groups. There was a mid-2011 jump in extortion 
across the board [see Table 2], not only in states where self-defense groups formed. 
Rough terrain and atypical geography, a common thread in the literature, favors 
marginalization and therefore the emergence of self-defense groups. Indigenous 
communities’ native lands are often in rugged locations alienated from instruments of 
state control. Geography plays a role in marginalization, but it alone cannot predict social 
rebellion. Nevertheless, it is undeniable that the desert region connecting Michoacán and 
Guerrero, key break out cases, made these likely sites for the start of a self-defense 
movement. 
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 The self-defense movement, like many social movements, was eventually co-
opted by larger institutional forces. President Peña Nieto created a pathway for official 
integration of the self-defense groups with the creation of a Rural Force in May 2014. 
Former self-defense group members could continue to operate if they identified 
themselves, registered their weapons, wore a uniform, and worked with the police. 
Unregistered arms after May 2014 were not to be permitted. Some people did join this 
somewhat toothless adaptation of a self-defense group, but most did not. Several of the 
movement’s original leaders were incarcerated under murder charges. The pace of the 
groups’ slowed, and the movement withered. The self-defense groups lived and died by 
the involvement of the state government. First, the state turned a blind eye to the groups’ 
unexpected success, but eventually they stamped it out. 
 The brief victory of these righteous peasants, represented by indigenous farmers 
armed with machetes or a phalanx of villagers in cheap white t-shirts reading “GRUPO 
DE AUTODEFENSA”, did not alter the large forces perpetuating the Mexican drug war. 
The self-defense movement was not about DEA agents secretly shuttling machine guns to 
Sinaloa members or the $30 billion66 annually brought in through the drug trade. It was 
about limes, avocados, and corn. 
 Indigenous communities, under threat severe enough to risk rebellion, have 
despite the 20th century history of marginalization and de facto neglect from the state, 
have managed not only cultural survival, but also cultural thriving. Against the opposing 
strain of globalization, they have re-opened a discourse about communal and small-owner 
land rights. In between 1970-2000, all indigenous languages increased the number of 
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users.67 The languages with the largest growth rates were located in the states of Oaxaca, 
Chiapas, and Guerrero68: all most-likely cases with operating self-defense groups. 
Mexico’s indigenous communities are growing, not dwindling. Indigenous life has 
thrived in and partially due to a political environment of hostility. 
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